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Abstract. Like all computerized systems, ballot-marking devices (BMDs) can be hacked,
misprogrammed, and misconfigured. BMD printout might not reflect what the BMD
screen or audio conveyed to the voter. If voters complain that BMDs misbehaved, officials
have no way to tell whether BMDs malfunctioned, the voters erred, or the voters are
attempting to cast doubt on the election. Several approaches to testing BMDs have been
proposed. In pre-election logic and accuracy (L&A) tests, trusted agents input known test
patterns into the BMD and check whether the printout matches. In parallel or live testing,
trusted agents use the BMDs on election day, emulating voters. In passive testing, trusted
agents monitor the rate at which voters “spoil” ballots and request another opportunity
to mark a ballot: an anomalously high rate might result from BMD malfunctions. In
practice, none of these methods can protect against outcome-altering problems. L&A
testing is ineffective against malware in part because BMDs “know” the time and date of
the test and the election. Neither L&A nor parallel testing can probe even a small fraction
of the combinations of voter preferences, device settings, ballot language, duration of
voter interaction, input and output interfaces, and other variables that could comprise
enough votes to change outcomes. Under mild assumptions, to develop a model of voter
interactions with BMDs accurate enough to ensure that parallel tests could reliably detect
changes to 5% of the votes (which could change margins by 10% or more) would require
monitoring the behavior of more than a million voters in each jurisdiction in minute
detail—but the median turnout by jurisdiction in the U.S. is under 3000 voters, and 2/3 of
U.S. jurisdictions have fewer than 43,000 active voters. Moreover, all voter privacy would
be lost. Given an accurate model of voter behavior, the number of tests required is still
larger than the turnout in a typical U.S. jurisdiction. Even if less testing sufficed, it would
require extra BMDs, new infrastructure for creating test interactions and reporting test
results, additional polling-place staff, and more training. Under optimistic assumptions,
passive testing that has a 99% chance of detecting a 1% change to the margin with a 1%
false alarm rate is impossible in jurisdictions with fewer than about 1 million voters, even
if the “normal” spoiled ballot rate were known exactly and did not vary from election to
election and place to place. Passive testing would also require training and infrastructure
to monitor the spoiled ballot rate in real time. And if parallel or passive testing discovers
a problem, the only remedy is a new election: there is no way to reconstruct the correct
election result from an untrustworthy paper trail. Minimizing the number of votes cast
using BMDs is prudent election administration.
Keywords: elections, logic and accuracy testing, parallel testing, live testing
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1 Introduction: Why test BMDs?
BMDs can print votes that differ from those confirmed to the voter onscreen or through
the BMD audio interface. In effect, BMDs make the paper trail hackable. Some have
argued that this BMD security flaw does not compromise election integrity because BMD
printout is “voter-verifiable”: voters have the opportunity to inspect the BMD printout
before casting it, and spoil it and start over if it does not match their intended selections
(Quesenbery 2018). It has also been argued that since voters can make mistakes marking
a ballot by hand, hand-marked ballots are no more secure or reliable than BMD printout
(Quesenbery 2018).
The premises are correct, but the conclusions are not. Those arguments do not take the
overall security of the election into account. They equate holding voters responsible for
their own errors and holding voters responsible for the overall security of a vulnerable
electronic system (Stark 2019; A. W. Appel, DeMillo, and Stark 2020; A. W. Appel and
Stark 2020). Moreover, recent studies show that most voters in fact do not inspect BMD
printout (DeMillo, Kadel, and Marks 2018; Bernhard et al. 2020) and that those who do
rarely detect actual errors (Bernhard et al. 2020). This is consistent with previous work
on direct-recording electronic voting systems (DREs) (Everett 2007; Campbell and Byrne
2009).
Current BMDs and the rules for their use make voters responsible for BMD security but
do not give voters the tools they need to do that job: if the device prints votes that differ
from what the voter confirmed electronically, only the voter can have evidence of the
problem (Stark 2019; A. W. Appel, DeMillo, and Stark 2020). BMDs do not generate
any evidence the voter can present to a third party to prove the machine misbehaved.3
There is no way for an election official to tell whether a voter’s complaint that a BMD
malfunctioned signals a BMD malfunction, a voter error, or a cry of “wolf.” As a result,
error or malfeasance could change a large percentage of votes without inducing election
officials to act, beyond offering those voters who notice problems another chance to mark
a ballot. Moreover, if a problem is detected, the only remedy is to hold a new election:
there is no way to figure out which printed votes were affected, how they were affected,
or who really won: the system is not strongly software independent in the terminology of
(Rivest and Wack 2006).
Voting system vendors are promoting the use of ballot-marking devices (BMDs) by all
voters, and several states recently purchased or are currently contemplating purchasing
enough BMDs for all voters to use. There is evidence that such “universal use” BMD
systems are more expensive than systems that primarily use hand-marked paper ballots
augmented by BMDs as needed for accessibility (Perez 2019).
Advocates of BMDs point to usability benefits such as preventing overvotes, warning vot-
ers about undervotes, and eliminating ambiguous marks (e.g., (Quesenbery 2018)). Those
arguments are misleading. First, they assume that the BMDs function correctly, which is
far from guaranteed.4 Indeed, this is the reason testing is needed. Second, precinct-based
3 Voters could take “ballot selfie” videos of their interaction with the BMD, the review screen, and the
printout, but that would compromise voter privacy and is illegal in many jurisdictions. Moreover, it
would not be hard for malicious voters to fake problems by revising their selections before printing,
or by constructing a “deep fake.” That opens elections to attacks on public confidence by spreading
unwarranted fear, uncertainty, and doubt (FUD).
4 For examples of the fragility of universal-use BMD systems, see, e.g., (Sneed 2020; Zetter 2020;
Previti 2019; Harte 2020; Cillizza 2020; Mehrotra and Newkirk 2019)
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optical scanners also protect against undervotes and overvotes—indeed, the Voluntary
Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) require it.5 Third, the rate of truly ambiguous voter
marks is minuscule (A. W. Appel, DeMillo, and Stark 2020).
Whatever benefits a perfectly functioning BMD might confer, elections conducted using
BMDs are not trustworthy unless there is a way to ensure that BMDs print the same
votes that voters indicated through the touchscreen or other interface, and were shown
on the review screen or told through the audio interface—or at least that the rate at which
BMDs altered votes did not change any electoral outcomes.
How might one establish that BMDs performed well enough to trust that the reported
winners really won?
Three testing approaches have been proposed: pre-election logic and accuracy (L&A)
testing, “passive” testing by monitoring the spoiled ballot rate during the election, and
“live” or “parallel” testing during the election. These testing approaches can reveal some
kinds of problems. But when the test results are clean, that does not mean there was
no problem to be found: it is crucial to distinguish between “tests found no evidence of
a problem” and “tests provide evidence that problems, if any, did not alter outcomes.”
Sufficiently weak testing–or no testing at all–will guarantee the first. But it takes strong
testing to guarantee the latter, stronger as the number of votes required to alter one or
more outcomes shrinks.
We first examine L&A testing briefly, although our quantitative results for parallel testing
provide additional proof that L&A testing cannot suffice. L&A testing involves testers
using (randomly selected) BMDs prior to the election to record a pre-specified set of
votes, then checking whether the BMD printout matches those votes. Typically, testers
use dozens to perhaps hundreds of vote patterns. (In analyzing parallel testing below, we
show that that number is inadequate by many orders of magnitude.) L&A testing is a
valuable routine precaution against some configuration errors (e.g., swapped candidate
or contest names), but it cannot be relied upon to discover malware or subtle bugs. This
was made clear, for example, by the widespread malfunctions of the ExpressVote R© XL
system when it debuted in Northampton, PA, in 2019, and failures in roughly 40% of
Philadelphia’s precincts in 2019 (Harte 2020)–after passing L&A testing.
It is not generally possible to probe even a tiny fraction of the possible vote combinations
during L&A testing: that would take far too long, as shown below. Moreover, malware
installed on a BMD can “know” that it is being tested, for instance, if the L&A test is
not during polling hours on election day. Even if testers reset the BMD internal clock
to election day, the way L&A testers interact with the device is unlikely to match how
every voter interacts with the device. The difference may allow malware to tell reliably the
whether the BMD is being used by a voter or a tester, much like the malicious software
involved in the VW “Dieselgate” scandal (Hotten 2015).
To address some of the shortcomings of L&A testing, some have proposed parallel or
live testing, where trusted agents (testers) mark ballots on election day using the same
BMDs voters are using, or (nominally) identically configured BMDs randomly set aside
on election day. The printout is compared to the testers’ input selections, but not cast.
5 Such protection has been required since VVSG 1.0: section 2.3.3.2, Paper-based System Requirements,
says ” . . . all paper-based precinct count systems shall:
e. Provide feedback to the voter that identifies specific contests for which he or she has made no
selection or fewer than the allowable number of selections (e.g., undervotes)
f. Notify the voter if he or she has made more than the allowable number of selections for any contest
(e.g., overvotes).(U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2005)
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Even a single discrepancy is evidence of a serious problem: at least one BMD alters votes.
If the parallel testing is done by setting aside machines at random, it is more vulnerable
to a Dieselgate-style attack, because a machine used only by testers will probably be used
quite differently than machines used only by voters, allowing malware to determine with
some accuracy whether it is “safe” to misbehave.
(Wallach 2019) suggests using the spoiled ballot rate for passive testing: if a surprising
number of voters request replacement ballots, that might be because the machines are
malfunctioning. If we knew the spoiled ballot rate under normal circumstances, then if
the observed rate is high enough, there would be a basis for sounding an alarm–without
having an unacceptably high false-alarm rate.
Here, we explore whether L&A testing, parallel testing, or passive testing can establish
whether the outcome of elections conducted on BMDs are trustworthy. We conclude that
none of those methods can work in practice: it would require unobtainably accurate models
of voter behavior and too much testing.
2 How much testing is enough?
The amount of testing required to establish that BMDs functioned adequately during
the election depends on the size of the problem deemed “material.” A sensible threshold
for materiality is “enough to change the reported winner of one or more contests.” We
therefore consider testing to be inadequate unless it has a large chance of detecting prob-
lems that changed the outcome (i.e., who or what won) of one or more contests. In turn,
that depends on contest sizes (the number of ballots the contests appear on) and contest
margins. For illustration, we consider margins of 1% and 5% in contests of various sizes.
Many contests are decided by less than 1%. For instance, the margin in the 2016 U.S. pres-
idential election was 0.22% in Michigan, 0.37% in Rhode Island, 0.72% in Pennsylvania,
and 0.76% in Wisconsin. If the outcome had been different in Michigan, Pennsylvania,
and Wisconsin, Donald Trump would have received fewer than 270 electoral votes, the
number required to win.
Elections need to be protected against a malicious, technically capable attacker, such
as a nation state.6 If testing has a high probability of detecting that an outcome was
altered by a clever attacker, it also protects against misconfiguration and bugs, since a
clever attacker could emulate the behavior of misconfiguration or bugs. We also assume
henceforth that the attacker does not want to be detected. (Some attackers might seek
to undermine public confidence by spreading fear, uncertainty, and doubt–FUD–in which
case being detected may serve their ends.)
To determine how much testing is required, we frame auditing as a two-player adversarial
game and explore the strategy spaces available to a malefactor (“Mallory”) and a tester
(“Pat”). Combining results from minimax estimation with information about possible
BMD settings, voter interactions with BMDs, contest sizes, margins, and jurisdiction
sizes shows that L&A testing, parallel testing, and passive testing cannot offer adequate
assurance in practice.
6 The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee concluded that Russian state hackers attacked U.S. elections
in 2016, as did the Department of Homeland Security and the FBI (Committee 2018)
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3 Auditing as an adversarial game
Nothing in this paper should be construed to imply that parallel testing or passive testing
only needs to detect malicious attacks: Bugs, misconfiguration, and other problems can
also alter contest outcomes. Testing does not make elections trustworthy unless it has a
sufficiently large chance of detecting outcome-changing problems, whatever their cause.
The game. Mallory seeks to alter the outcome of one or more contests in an election.
Mallory does not want to be detected.
Pat seeks to ensure that any BMD problem that alters one or more outcomes will be
detected.7 Pat is constrained to obey the law and to protect voter privacy. Pat does not
know which contest(s) Mallory will attack nor Mallory’s strategy.
In contrast, Mallory does not need to obey the law and knows Pat’s testing strategy before
the election: it will be a matter of law or regulation (even though it might contain random
elements, such as selecting machines to test at random, or adaptive rules that depend on
how busy the machines are, historical voter preferences, exit polls, etc.).
Mallory can use the state history of each machine, including votes, machine settings, etc.
Mallory has access to voter behavior in past elections, including details about political
preferences, voting speed, BMD settings, and so on, because Mallory might have installed
malware before past elections. Mallory may have an accurate estimate of contest margins,
for instance, from public polls, social media, and the like.
If the BMDs are networked or have radios, Mallory might be able to communicate with
BMDs in real-time during the election. If not, Mallory’s strategy needs to be fixed in
software before election day, but misbehavior might still be triggered by a “cryptic knock,”
such as touching the machine in a way that a typical voter is unlikely to do.8 Regardless,
Mallory can use information from past elections and the current election to minimize the
chance of being caught.
Mallory seeks a strategy that alters the outcome of one or more contests with only a
small chance of being detected by Pat’s testing. Pat seeks a strategy that ensures that
if Mallory does alter the outcome of one or more contests, testing has a high chance of
detecting it, while keeping the chance of a false alarm small.
3.1 Jurisdiction sizes, contest sizes, and contest margins
While federal elections (especially the presidential election) get a great deal of attention,
there are important contests with sizes ranging from dozens of eligible voters to millions
of eligible voters. Mallory might be interested in attacking any or all of them.
7 Pat will not be able to reconstruct the correct election outcome, even if Pat detect Mallory’s attack:
elections conducted on BMDs are not defensible, in the terminology of (A. W. Appel, DeMillo, and
Stark 2020).
8 E.g., (Mercuri 1992) writes, “One might then believe that the functional verification process, in
issuing input sequences that are examined against the audit trail printout, guarantees that the
auditing method is correct. It does not take much imagination to create a scenario in which a
particular Trojan horse program is activated by a special sequence of keypresses on the DRE (the
systems allow for a voter to select a candidate and then de-select it, numerous times – the ballot is
not recorded until the end of vote is signaled).”
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Elections in the U.S. are administered locally, typically by individual counties, townships,
or other political units. That limits both the number of parallel tests that can be per-
formed that are relevant to a given contest and the number of voters who contribute to
passive tests. Because ballot layouts, contests, voting equipment, demographics, political
preferences, and other variables vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, it is difficult to
“borrow strength” by pooling data across jurisdictions: the appropriate unit of analysis
is the jurisdiction or the contest (if the contest does not span an entire jurisdiction). Ar-
guably, the unit should defined by ballot style, since BMDs must be configured to present
the correct ballot style to each voter and could be programmed to behave differently for
different ballot styles.
According to (U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2018), in 2018, the median turnout
in the 3017 U.S. counties was 2,980 voters, and was less than 43,000 voters for more than
2/3 of jurisdictions. In 72.5% of states, more than 50% of counties have fewer than 30,000
active voters. In 92.2% of states, more than 50% of counties have fewer than 100,000
active voters.
Fig. 1. Total participation on election day per jurisdiction in 3073 counties in 2018 (U.S. Election
Assistance Commission 2018). Counties ordered from small to large, plotted against total voter turnout.
3.2 Voting transactions
We shall call a voter’s interaction with the BMD a voting transaction. A voting trans-
action includes more than the voter’s ultimate selections and the device settings. It is
characterized by a large number of variables, including:
– time of day the transaction starts
– the time since the previous voter finished using the BMD (a measure of how busy the
polling place is)
– the number of voting transactions before the current transaction
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Fig. 2. Heat map of median 2018 turnout by jurisdiction in the 50 U.S. states and Washington, DC.
(U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2018).
– the voter’s sequence of selections in each contest, including undervotes, before going
to the next selection
– the number of times the voter changes selections in each contest in the first pass
through the ballot, and what the voter changed the selection from and to, etc.
– the amount of time the voter takes to make each selection before taking another
action (e.g., going to the next contest)
– whether the voter looks every page of candidates in a contest (some BMDs cannot
list more than a few candidates per page)
– how much time (if any) the voter takes to review selections, which selections the voter
changes, etc.
– whether the voter receives an inactivity warning during voting (Commission 2015)
– what part of each onscreen voting target the voter touches
– BMD settings, including font size, language, whether the audio interface is used and (if
so) the volume setting, tempo setting, whether the voter pauses the audio, whether the
voter “rewinds,” and whether the voter uses audio only or synchronized audio/video
(Commission 2015)
– whether the voter uses the sip-and-puff interface
Table 1 shows some of the variables, ranges of possible values, and the corresponding
cardinality of the support of the distribution of voting transactions.
Table 1: Some parameters of voting transactions with a BMD and the
number of values they can take.
Parameter optimistic more realistic
Contests 3 20
Candidates per Contest 2 4
Languages 2 13
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Parameter optimistic more realistic
Time of day 10 20
Number of previous voters 5 10
Undervotes 23 220
Changed selections 23 220
Review 2 2
Time per selection 2 520
Contrast/saturation - 4
Font Size 2 4
Audio Use 2 2
Audio tempo - 4
Volume 5 10
Audio pause - 220
Audio + video - 2
Inactivity warning 2 220
Total combinations 6.14× 106 1.2× 1047
The values in Table 1 are reasonable for U.S. elections, and show that there is a staggering
number of possible voting transactions.9 The values in the table assume that every contest
allows voting for only one candidate. If there are ranked-choice voting or instant-runoff
voting contests or multi-winner plurality contests, the number of possible transactions
is larger. Continuous variables, such as the time per selection and time of day, have
been binned into a modest number of options. Many possibilities have been neglected.
Nonetheless, the size of the support of the distribution of possible interactions is enormous.
Mallory can use all these variables to choose a subset of transactions to alter that Pat
is unlikely to probe, but that are sufficiently numerous to change election outcomes. For
instance, Mallory might program a subset of BMDs to alter votes in one or more contests
only when the voter starts the transaction between 11:30am and 12:30pm, uses the audio
9 According to (Augenblick and Nicholson 2016), in 2000, in the 1,508 precincts in San Diego, Propo-
sition 35 appeared anywhere between 9th and 19th on the ballot with a mean position of 15.8 and
standard deviation of 2.1: the number of contests in U.S. elections can be large, and any given contest
can appear in many places on the ballot. (Augenblick and Nicholson 2016) also report that the mean
of candidates per contest in 13 elections was 2.8. According to (County of LA 2017), Los Angeles
provided ballots in 13 languages in 2017. According to the 2015 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines
(U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2015), (a) Alternative language access is mandated under the
Voting Rights Act of 1975, subject to certain thresholds (e.g., if the language group exceeds 5% of
the voting age population). (b) The voting system shall provide the voter the opportunity to correct
the ballot for either an undervote or overvote before the ballot is cast and counted. (c) An Acc-VS
with a color electronic image display shall allow the voter to adjust the color saturation through-
out the voting transaction while preserving the current votes. (d) At a minimum, two alternative
display options listed shall be available: 1) black text on white background, 2) white text on black
background, 3) yellow text on a black background, or 4) light cyan text on a black background. (e)
A voting system that uses an electronic image display shall be capable of showing all information in
at least two font sizes. (f) The audio system shall allow the voter to control the volume throughout
the voting transaction while preserving the current votes. (g) The volume shall be adjustable from a
minimum of 20dB SPL up to a maximum of 100 dB SPL, in increments no greater than 10 dB. (h)
The audio system shall allow the voter to control the rate of speech throughout the voting transaction
while preserving the current votes. (i) The range of speeds supported shall include 75% to 200% of
the nominal rate. In contrast to the U.S., many countries have only one or two contests per election.
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interface with volume at least 70dB and pace reduced to 75%, takes longer than 2 minutes
per selection, takes less than 10 seconds to review each selection, and makes no selection
in at least 3 contests, including the contest Mallory seeks to alter. If there are enough
such transactions to alter the result of that contest but Pat does not have a large chance
of conducting a test that matches that pattern, Mallory succeeds. Section 5.4 examines
the implications for testing.
3.3 How many votes must be altered to alter the outcome?
To minimize the chance of being detected, Mallory will alter no more votes than necessary
to change the outcome (with some allowance for error). That number depends on the
margin of the contest, expressed as the number of ballots that would need to be altered
to change the reported winner. The margin expressed as a percentage is not directly
relevant.
For instance, changing votes on 1% of ballots in a jurisdiction can alter the margin of
a jurisdiction-wide plurality contest by 2% if there are no undervotes or invalid votes in
that contest, but by more than 2% if there are undervotes or invalid votes.10 For instance,
if the undervote rate is 30%, then changing votes on 1% of the ballots can change the
margin by 0.02/0.7 = 2.9%.
Altering the votes on 1% of ballots cast in a jurisdiction can change the margin of contests
that are not jurisdiction-wide by far more than 2%. For instance, if a contest is only on
10% of the ballots in the jurisdiction, altering votes on 1% of ballots in the jurisdiction
could change the margin in that particular contest by as much as 20% if there are no
undervotes, and more if there are undervotes. For instance, if the undervote rate in the
contest is 30%, altering the votes on 1% of ballots could change the margin in that
particular contest by nearly 29%.
4 Passive testing
To set the threshold for triggering an alarm for passive testing requires estimating an
appropriate percentile of the “benign” probability distribution of spoiled ballots when
BMDs function correctly. E.g., if we want to ensure that passive testing has a false alarm
rate of at most 5%, we need to estimate the 95th percentile of the distribution of spoiled
ballots when the BMDs function correctly. This is hard, for a number of reasons. First,
the distribution may depend on things that vary from election to election, such as the
number of contests on the ballot, whether the contests have complex voting rules (e.g.,
instant-runoff voting), ballot layout, voter demographics, turnout, voter familiarity with
the voting technology, etc. Second, it presumes we have a reference election in which the
10 The usual way of reporting margins ignores undervotes: it is the difference between the number of
votes the winner and runner-up received, divided by the number of valid votes in the contest. The
“diluted margin” is the difference between the number of votes the winner and runner-up received,
divided by the total number of ballots cast in the contest, rather than the total number of votes cast
in the contest. The diluted margin is never larger than the ordinary margin, but it can be much
smaller. Changing the votes on x% of the ballots can change the diluted margin by up to 2x%, but
can change the ordinary margin more.
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machines are known to have functioned flawlessly. Third, it takes large sample sizes even
if the rate did not vary from place to place and election to election.
We also need to know something about the distribution of spoiled ballots when BMDs
malfunction, to control the false negative rate–the probability that Pat will not detect
that a contest outcome has been changed. That depends in detail on the number of
transactions Mallory alters, which voters are affected, which contests are affected, etc.
Pat will not know any of those things.
For illustration, assume that when BMDs function correctly, voters spoil their ballots at
random, following a Poisson distribution with known rate, and that when BMDs have
been hacked, voters spoil their ballots at random, following a Poisson distribution, with
a known, higher rate. (There is no particular justification for assuming the distribution is
Poisson, but the Poisson distribution is a common stochastic model for the occurrence of
rare events. Even if the distribution were known to be Poisson, the rate would be unknown
in practice and would have to be estimated from relevant data.) This gives us a best-case
scenario.
Even with these optimistic assumptions, the effectiveness of passive testing depends on
the “benign” rate of spoilage in this Poisson distribution, on the number of voters who
cast votes in the contest, and on the fraction of voters who will notice errors and spoil
their ballots. We assume either that 7% of voters will notice errors and spoil their ballots,
consistent with the findings of (Bernhard et al. 2020), or that 25% of voters will. This
assumption is optimistic in an adversarial context: Mallory could target voters who are
less likely to notice errors in the BMD printout; see Section 4.1.
We consider contest margins of 1%–5% and false positive and false negative rates of 5%
and 1%. A false negative means the election outcome is altered without being detected;
a false positive means contest outcomes were in fact correct, but the passive test signals
a problem.
Table 2: Number of voters that a contest must include for passive testing
with a 5% false negative rate to have at most a 5% false positive rate, as
a function of the the contest margin (column 1), the percentage of voters
who would spoil their ballots if the BMD printout had errors (column 2),
and the base rate of “benign” ballot spoilage (columns 3-5). Calculations
assume that the distribution of spoiled ballots is Poisson, with exactly
known rate in the absence of malfunctions. If there are malfunctions, the
rate is increased by half the margin times the detection rate.
margin detection rate 0.5% base rate 1% base rate 1.5% base rate
1% 7% 451,411 893,176 1,334,897
25% 37,334 71,911 106,627
2% 7% 115,150 225,706 336,160
25% 9,919 18,667 27,325
3% 7% 52,310 101,382 150,471
25% 4,651 8,588 12,445
4% 7% 30,000 57,575 85,227
25% 2,788 4,960 7,144
5% 7% 19,573 37,245 54,932
25% 1,838 3,274 4,689
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Table 3: Same as Table Table 2 but for false positive and false negative
rates of 1% instead of 5%.
margin detection rate 0.5% base rate 1% base rate 1.5% base rate
1% 7% 908,590 1,792,330 2,675,912
25% 76,077 145,501 214,845
2% 7% 233,261 454,295 675,242
25% 20,624 38,039 55,442
3% 7% 106,411 204,651 302,864
25% 9,870 17,674 25,359
4% 7% 61,385 116,631 171,908
25% 5,971 10,312 14,681
5% 7% 40,156 75,671 110,989
25% 4,036 6,849 9,650
Software to calculate these numbers is in https://github.com/pbstark/Parallel19. Com-
bining Tables 2, 3 with Figure 1 shows that in 2018, in 73% of U.S. states fewer than half
the counties had enough voters for passive testing to work, even in county-wide contests,
on the assumption that 7% of voters whose votes are altered will notice it and spoil their
ballots–even if the probability distribution of spoiled ballots were known to be Poisson and
the spoilage rate when equipment functions correctly were known perfectly. The situation
is worse for smaller contests.
For context, 41 of California’s 58 counties had fewer than 100,000 voters in the 2018
midterm election (California Secretary of State 2018a) and 33 had fewer than 100,000
voters in the 2016 Presidential primary election (California Secretary of State 2016): even
if spoiled ballots were known to have a Poisson distribution with rate 0.5% in the absence
of problems, passive testing could not protect contests with margins of 3% or smaller. In
many California counties, turnout is so small even in statewide contests that there would
be no way to detect problems through spoilage rates reliably without incurring a high
rate of false alarms. If turnout is roughly 50%, contests in jurisdictions with fewer than
60,000 voters (which includes 23 of California’s 58 counties (California Secretary of State
2018b)) could not in principle limit the chance of false positives and of false negatives to
5% for margins below 4%—even under these optimistic assumptions and simplifications.
4.1 Targeting the attack
The analysis above assumes that all voters are equally likely to detect that the printout
does not match their selections and to spoil their ballots in response. But Mallory has
access to each BMD’s settings state history, and session data. So Mallory can select whose
votes to alter, inferring voter characteristics from BMD settings and the voters’ interaction
with the BMD. That allows Mallory to target voters who are less likely to notice problems
(and who are perhaps less likely to be believed if they report malfunctions).
Voters with visual impairments Approximately 0.8% of the U.S. population
is legally blind; approximately 2% of Americans age 16 to 64 have a visual impairment
(National Federation of the Blind 2019). Current BMDs do not provide voters with visual
impairments a way to check whether the printout matches their selections: they must
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trust that the screen or audio interface accurately conveys what the device later prints or
bring their own assistive technology to check the printout. If 2% of voters have a visual
impairment that prevents them from checking the printout and Mallory only alters votes
when the voter uses the audio interface or large fonts, Mallory might be able to change
the outcomes of contests with jurisdiction-wide margins of 4% or more without increasing
the spoiled ballot rate.
Voters with motor impairments Some BMDs allow voters to print and cast
a ballot without looking at it, for instance the ES&S ExpressVote R© with “Autocast,”
which has been dubbed the “permission to cheat” feature (Appel 2018). Voters who use
this feature have no opportunity to check whether the printout matches their selections
nor to spoil the ballot if there is a discrepancy. Mallory can change every vote cast using
this feature without increasing the spoiled ballot rate.
Voters who use languages other than English Federal law requires
some jurisdictions to provide ballots in languages other than English. One advantage of
BMDs is that they can display ballots in many languages, so jurisdictions do not have to
pre-print ballots in many languages. (Ballot-on-demand printers also solve this problem.)
Los Angeles County, CA, provides voting materials in 13 languages, including English
(Los Angeles County Clerk 2020). In 2013, roughly 26% of voters in Los Angeles County
spoke a language other than English at home (Los Angeles County Clerk 2020). It is our
understanding that BMDs can display ballots in languages other than English, but that
they are generally configured to print only in English. If a substantial percentage of vot-
ers use foreign-language ballots and are unlikely to check the English-language printout,
Mallory could change the outcome of contests with large margins without increasing the
spoiled ballot rate noticeably.
This section and Sections 4.1, 4.1, above, show that Mallory can hack BMDs to selectively
disenfranchise exactly the same groups of voters BMDs are supposed to help: voters with
visual impairments, voters with limited dexterity, and voters who need or prefer to vote
in a language other than English. It is in Mallory’s interests to target those voters, since
it reduces the chance the interference will be detected.
Voters in a hurry, et al. Mallory can monitor how long it takes voters to
make their selections, whether they change selections, how long they review the summary
screen, etc. A voter who spends little time reviewing selections onscreen also might be
unlikely to review the printout carefully. Conversely, if a voter takes a very long time to
mark a ballot or changes selections repeatedly, that might be a sign that the voter finds
voting difficult or confusing; such voters might also be unlikely to notice errors in the
printout. By targeting voters who are unlikely to review the printout or to notice changes
to their votes, Mallory can change more votes without markedly increasing the spoiled
ballot rate.
4.2 FUD attacks on passive testing
Even under ideal circumstances, passive testing using the spoiled ballot rate does not
produce direct evidence of malfeasance or malfunction; it does not identify which ballots
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and which contests, if any, have errors; and it does not provide any evidence about whether
the errors, if any, changed outcomes. Moreover, relying on spoiled ballots as a sign of fraud
opens the door to a simple, legal way to undermine elections: ask voters to spoil ballots.
5 L&A testing and parallel testing
Suppose that Mallory hacks a BMD to alter one or more votes on a ballot with probability
p, independently across ballots, uniformly across voters—regardless of the selections the
voter made, the time of day, or any of the BMD settings or any aspect of voter behavior
that Mallory can access. Then if Pat makes n tests, the chance that the BMD will alter at
least one of the votes in at least one of the tests—and thus that Pat will catch Mallory—is
1− (1− p)n.
For p = 0.01 (i.e., a 1% chance that the BMD alters votes on each voting transaction,
independently across transactions), marking n = 50 test ballots would give a 39% chance
of catching Mallory. To have a 95% chance, Pat would need to run n = 300 tests.
We understand that a BMD can handle up to 140 voting transactions on election day.
Testing enough to have a 95% chance of detecting a 1% problem on one BMD, i.e., 300
tests, would leave no time for voters to use that BMD. Even for pre-election L&A testing,
where capacity for actual voters is not an issue, conducting 300 “typical” tests would take
about 25 hours.
If there were a large number of identically programmed machines, tests could be spread
across them, but as discussed above there are many small contests, all of which need
to be tested in conjunction with all other contests that appear on any ballot style that
contains them, and there is no guarantee that all BMDs in a jurisdiction are programmed
identically.
But this threat model is completely unrealistic. Changing votes at random is not a good
strategy for Mallory. If Mallory wants Alice to beat Bob, Mallory will never alter a vote
for Alice: that would increase the number of votes Mallory needs to alter, increasing the
chance Pat will detect Mallory’s interference.
And Mallory has better strategies than simply randomly changing some votes for Bob
into votes for Alice. As discussed in Section 4.1, Mallory can hide the manipulation in
transactions that Pat is unlikely to probe. Table Table 1 shows that there are staggeringly
many possible voting transactions. For Mallory to alter the outcome of one or more
elections, Mallory must alter enough actual transactions to overcome the true margin.
This will be easier in smaller contests and in contests with smaller margins. Conversely, it
will be harder for Pat to conduct a sufficient number of tests in smaller contests: smaller
contests are easier to attack and harder to defend.
Yet many smaller contests are politically important. As of 2019, only 317 U.S. cities
had populations of 100,000 or more, out of over 19,500 incorporated places (U.S. Census
Bureau 2019). On the assumption that 80% of the population is of voting age and that
turnout is 55%, the contests for elected officials in (19, 500 − 317)/19, 500 = 98% of
incorporated places involve fewer than 0.55 × 0.8 × 100000 = 44, 000 voters. The 2019
median population of U.S. incorporated areas is 725, implying that about half of the
19,500 incorporated places have turnout of 320 or fewer voters. Mallory does not have to
change many votes to alter the outcome of a typical contest for an elected official in a
U.S. city or incorporated township.
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5.1 Randomness is key
Pat’s tests need to be unpredictable—with respect to time, vote pattern, other variables
that characterize a voting transaction, and the specific BMDs tested—or Mallory could
avoid detection by altering only transactions that do not correspond to any of Pat’s tests.
As mentioned above, Pat might be tempted to set aside specific machines for testing.
But that opens the door to a “Dieselgate” type attack. Pat may be tempted to conduct
tests on a schedule. For instance, (Gilbert 2019) suggests testing once an hour. But if the
time of tests is predictable (e.g., hourly, or after 5 voters have used the BMD), it would
be easy for Mallory to avoid detection. Similarly, there will likely be pressure to reduce
testing when BMDs are busy, to avoid creating or exacerbating lines. Because malware
can monitor the pace of voting, reducing testing when machines are busy would also make
it easier for Mallory to avoid detection.
To have a large chance of detecting Mallory’s interference, Pat needs to have a large
chance of generating a test transaction that Mallory alters. That might mean testing
particular machines using particular vote patterns at particular times of day when the
machines have been used in a particular way—and interacting with the machines in a
particular way, for instance, using the audio interface at 150% of normal speed, changing
the font size, displaying the ballot in a language other than English, taking more than
1 minute but less than 2 minutes per selection, revising several selections, spending less
than 1 minute reviewing selections, etc.
Because the space of possible voting transactions is so large—conservatively well over 106
possibilities in a typical U.S. election, as shown in Table 1—uniform sampling from the set
of possible transactions is not a good strategy for Pat. Instead, Pat needs to sample more
frequent transactions with higher probability to try to ensure a large chance of sampling
transactions that occur frequently enough to alter one or more outcomes: Pat needs a
good model of voting transactions.
There are obstacles.
First, Mallory does not need to alter many transactions to alter the outcome of small
contests and contests with small margins. Depending on actual voter preferences, Mallory
can alter one or more outcomes by changing an arbitrarily small fraction of votes. The
fewer votes Mallory needs to alter to change an outcome, the more testing Pat needs to
conduct to have a large chance of noticing.
Second, Pat does not know which contest(s) and candidate(s) are affected. This asymme-
try helps Mallory.
Third, Mallory’s attack can be triggered by a vast number of combinations of many
variables, as sketched in Table 1.
Fourth, while every election is different (different voters, different contests, different can-
didates, different political context—“you can’t step in the same election twice”), Mallory
might be able to make a usefully accurate estimate of the distribution of voting transac-
tions using malware installed on BMDs in previous elections. But Pat will not be able to
estimate it well because to do so would require capability that BMDs running the correct
software should not have: tracking voter behavior in such minute detail would compromise
vote anonymity. This is another asymmetry that favors Mallory.
Fifth, Mallory can make testing very expensive for Pat, for instance, by only altering votes
for transactions that take longer than 10 minutes, by limiting interference to transactions
in which the voter changes some number of selections, by targeting transactions that use
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the audio interface at a reduced tempo, etc. A testing script cannot simply say “select the
following candidates and print the ballot.” It also has to specify the time of day, ballot
language, font size, contrast settings, whether the audio interface is to be used (and if so,
the tempo and volume), how long to spend on each selection, which selections (if any) to
change, how long to spend in review, etc. Creating testing scripts and training pollworkers
or others to follow them accurately is expensive, and conducting tests in these corners of
parameter space necessarily takes a long time.
5.2 Illustrative examples
Imagine a single contest expected to be neck-and-neck between Alice, Bob, Carol, and
Dan. Mallory knows that about 5% of voters eligible to vote in this contest display their
ballot in English, take more than 10 minutes to vote, and change at least two of their
selections before printing–and that this behavior is not associated with voter preferences.
Mallory rigs the machines to randomly change votes for Bob into votes for Alice with
50% probability, but only if the voter displays the ballot in English, takes more than 10
minutes to vote, and changes at least two selections. That will make Alice’s margin over
Bob 2.5%, and her margin over Carol and Dan 1.25%.
To have a 95% chance of finding this problem, Pat needs to conduct 5 tests in those
precincts where the testers display the ballot in English, select Bob in that contest, take
more than 10 minutes to vote, and change their selections at least twice (1− (1− 0.5)5 =
0.968). This alone would tie up BMDs for more more than 50 minutes. Since Pat does
not know ahead of time that Mallory is trying to rig the election in favor of Alice, to
protect just that single contest against the same hack in favor of the other candidates,
Pat also needs to do those tests but with votes for Alice, votes for Carol, votes for Dan,
and undervotes. That would tie BMDs up for 5× 50 = 250 minutes, i.e., 4 hours and 10
minutes.
Of course, Mallory might have hacked the BMDs to change votes for Carol into votes for
Alice, but only for voters who display the ballot in English, take 5-7 minutes to vote, and
do not change any selections. If voters who display the ballot in English, take less than 5-7
minutes to vote, and do not change any selections comprise 10% of voters, then Mallory
would only have to flip 25% of the votes for Carol in that group to votes for Alice to get
the same margins. To have 95% chance of detecting the problem, there need to be 11 tests
in those precincts where testers selected Carol, used an English ballot, took 5-7 minutes
to vote, and did not change any selections (1− (1− 0.25)11 = 0.958). Those 11 tests take
at least 55 minutes, and again, since the testers would not know in advance that Mallory
was using votes for Carol to benefit Alice, they also need to do those tests, using votes
for Alice, for Bob, for Dan, and undervotes. That would tie BMDs up for 5 × 55 = 275
minutes, i.e., 4 hours and 35 minutes.
Because the conditions that trigger those two attacks are mutually exclusive, testing for
one does not test for the other: Pat has to test for both. This brings us to 8 hours and 45
minutes of testing, just for these two possible attacks on that single contest, among many
other possible attacks.
For instance, Mallory might instead have changed votes for Bob into votes for Alice, but
only when the voter displays the ballot in a language other than English and takes 10
minutes or more to vote. If such voters comprise 10% of all voters, the calculation two
paragraphs above shows that to have a 95% chance of detecting this attack requires at
least another 4 hours and 35 minutes. We are now at 13 hours and 20 minutes of testing.
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But we have not exhausted the possible attacks, even on that one contest. For instance,
Mallory could have hacked the BMDs to change votes for other candidates into votes
for Alice only under other, mutually exclusive conditions, which could depend on other
variables as well, such as votes in other contests, time of day, recency of the last voter’s
transaction, BMD load, etc. The 13 hours of tests already described cannot not reveal
such hacks—even in principle—because the attacks involve mutually exclusive conditions.
And all of this testing is just for one contest. Once additional contests are on the ballot,
there need to be tests for attacks against them, too, and the attack on one contest can
depend on the voter’s selections in other contests.
5.3 Oracle bounds: “shoulder surfing”
Suppose Pat could ask an oracle whether a particular BMD printout had an error (equiv-
alently, suppose Pat could look over the shoulder of selected voters as they use the BMD,
then check the printout). Then Pat would not need to know the distribution of voting
transactions.
Suppose a contest has 2980 voters, the median jurisdiction turnout in 2018. Suppose that
the BMDs alter votes on 15 of the transactions, which could change the outcome of the
contest in question by more than 1% if there were no undervotes, and by still more if
there were undervotes. (For instance, if the undervote rate is 50%, then changing votes
on 0.5% of the ballots could change the margin by 2%.)
Pat can ask the oracle whether a set of randomly selected cast BMD printouts had any
errors. How big would that set need to be in order to have at least a 95% chance of finding
at least one printout with an error? The answer is the smallest value of n such that
2980− 15
2980
· 2979− 15
2979
· · · 2980− (n− 1)− 15
2980− (n− 1) ≤ 0.05, (1)
i.e., n = 540 printouts, about 18% of the voters. This translates to testing each BMD
several times an hour.
Conversely, suppose we limit Pat to 13 tests per day per machine (once per hour for a
13-hour day, about 9.2% of BMD capacity). To have at least a 95% chance of detecting
that the outcome of a contest with a 1% margin was altered, there would need to be at
least 6,580 voters in the contest, corresponding to 47 BMDs, even under these impossibly
optimistic assumptions. That is more almost triple the median turnout in jurisdictions
across the U.S., and roughly 20 times the median number of active voters in incorporated
areas in the U.S. Thus, even with a perfect model of voter behavior, Pat would have to
do more tests than there are voters in most jurisdiction-wide contests.
5.4 Building a model of voter behavior
In practice, Pat cannot “shoulder surf” and will need to estimate the distribution P of
voting transactions by monitoring voter interactions with BMDs. (This will compromise
voter privacy and might in fact be illegal.) Given an estimate Pˆ of P , Pat can then draw
test transactions from Pˆ to simulate the behavior of actual voters. In this section, we
discuss the practical limitations of this approach.
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We shall treat actual voting transactions as independent, identically distributed draws
from an unknown distribution P of transactions. Table Table 1 shows that the support of P
contains more than 108 points, even under optimistic assumptions. To give parallel testing
every possible advantage, we assume that the distribution P is concentrated on only 1%
of the smaller estimate of the number of possible distinguishable voting transactions, i.e.,
S = 1.89× 106 points.
Suppose Pat has a budget of T tests. The smaller T is, the more precise Pat’s estimate
Pˆ of the distribution P needs to be. Recall that for a jurisdiction-wide contest with no
undervotes or invalid votes, changing a fraction r of the transactions can change the
margin by 2r. To have probability at least 1− α of detecting a change to the outcome of
a contest with a true margin of 2r, Pat must conduct enough tests to have probability at
least 1−α of sampling at least once from every subset of the support of transactions that
has mass r. If Pat knew P perfectly, the number of independent tests Pat would need to
perform is the smallest t for which
(1− r)t ≤ α, (2)
i.e.,
t ≥ logα
log(1− r) . (3)
Since Pat has to estimate P from a training sample of voter interactions, the estimate Pˆ
of the true distribution P will have error. As a result, Pat will need to perform more tests
than the oracle bound requires.
Suppose Pat’s training sample of transactions is large enough to ensure with probability
1 − β that the estimated distribution differs from the true distribution by no more than
ε in L1 norm. If ε ≥ 2r, there may be a set τ of transactions for which P (τ) = r but
Pˆ (τ) = 0. Changing votes for transactions in τ could alter the margin of a jurisdiction-
wide contest by 2r or more—with zero chance of detection, no matter how many tests
Pat performs.
By how much does the uncertainty in Pˆ as an estimate of P increase the number of tests
Pat needs to perform? The minimum number of tests is the smallest t such that
(1 + ε/2− r)t ≤ α− β. (4)
There is no such t unless β < α. If Pat has a budget of at most T tests, then to protect
the outcome of a jurisdiction wide contest with margin 2r requires
ε ≤ 2
(
(α− β)1/T + r − 1
)
< 2r. (5)
Minimax lower bounds Suppose Pat draws an IID training sample of n trans-
actions from P to estimate Pˆ . (In effect, Pat spies on n voters selected uniformly at
random, with replacement.) Suppose there are S possible voting transactions. Let MS
denote the collection of all probability distributions on the S possible voting transactions.
Then Pat’s training sample must be at least large enough to ensure that the L1 error
of the best possible estimator is unlikely to exceed ε, no matter which element of MS P
happens to be. That is, Pat needs
inf
Pˆ
sup
P∈MS
Pr
P
{‖Pˆ − P‖1 ≤ ε} ≥ 1− β. (6)
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We shall find a (quite conservative) lower bound on the required training sample size n.
Theorem. ((Han, Jiao, and Weissman 2015)) For any ζ ∈ (0, 1],
inf
Pˆ
sup
P∈MS
EP ‖Pˆ − P‖1 ≥ 1
8
√
eS
(1 + ζ)n
1
(
(1 + ζ)n
S
>
e
16
)
+ exp
(
−2(1 + ζ)n
S
)
1
(
(1 + ζ)n
S
≤ e
16
)
− exp
(
−ζ
2n
24
)
− 12 exp
(
− ζ
2S
32(lnS)2
)
, (7)
{#eq:thm-minimax} where the infimum is over all MS-measurable estimators Pˆ .
Lemma. Let X be a random variable with variance VarX ≤ 1, and let β ∈ (0, 1). If
Pr{X ≥ EX + λ} ≤ β (8)
then λ ≥ −√β/(1− β).
Proof. Suppose λ ≥ 0. Then λ ≥ −√β/(1− β). Suppose λ < 0. By Cantelli’s inequality
and the premise of the lemma,
β ≥ Pr{X ≥ EX + λ} ≥ 1− σ
2
σ2 + λ2
=
λ2
σ2 + λ2
≥ λ
2
1 + λ2
. (9)
Solving for λ yields the desired inequality. .
Now 0 ≤ ‖Pˆ − P‖1 ≤ 2, so Var‖Pˆ − P‖1 ≤ 1. The lemma implies that to have
Pr{‖Pˆ − P‖1 ≥ EX + λ} ≤ β (10)
requires λ ≥ −√β/(1− β).
No matter how many tests Pat performs, if ‖Pˆ −P‖1 ≥ 2r, there can be a set of transac-
tions τ such that P (τ) = r but Pˆ (τ) = 0, so if Pat draws tests at random according to Pˆ
there is zero probability pat will try any transaction in τ . Thus if Pr{‖Pˆ−P‖1 ≥ 2r} > α,
even if Pat conducts an infinite number of tests, Pat cannot guarantee having chance at
least 1 − α detecting that Mallory changed a fraction r of the transactions, enough to
wipe out a margin of 2r. By the lemma, that is the case if 2r < E‖Pˆ −P‖1−
√
α/(1− α),
i.e., if E‖Pˆ − P‖1 > 2r +
√
α/(1− α).
The theorem gives a family of lower bounds on E‖Pˆ − P‖1 in terms of n. If the lower
bound exceeds 2r+
√
α/(1− α), testing by drawing transactions from Pˆ cannot provide
the guarantee Pat seeks.
The lower bound increases as the size S of the support of P increases. To be optimistic,
we use an unrealistically small value of S. Table 4 gives lower bounds on the size of the
training sample required if there are S = 6.14× 106 possible combinations of factors in a
voting transaction—far fewer than Table 1 shows there really are.11
To have a 95% chance of noticing that Mallory tampered with r = 5% or fewer trans-
actions, the training sample size would need to be at least 1.082 million voters, even if
Pat could conduct an infinite number of tests during the election. That is larger than the
total participation of 99.8% of jurisdictions in 2018 (U.S. Election Assistance Commission
2018) and roughly 0.7% of the voting population.
11 Software implementing the calculations is in https://github.com/pbstark/Parallel19 .
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To have 99% chance of detecting a change to 0.5% of transactions, which could change the
winner of jurisdiction-wide contests with margins of more than 1% would require observing
3.876 million voters in minute, privacy-eliminating detail. That is larger than the total
participation of 99.9% of jurisdictions in 2018 (U.S. Election Assistance Commission 2018)
and roughly 2.5% of the voting population.
According to (U.S. Census Bureau 2020), the US population in 2020 is 329 million, of
whom roughly 78% are voting age. If turnout is 60%, the total voting population is less
than 154 million.
Table 4: Lower bound on the sample size (in millions, column 4) required
to estimate the distribution of voting transactions accurately enough to
ensure a given probability (column 1) of detecting the manipulation of a
given fraction of transactions (column 3) using a given number of tests
(column 2), if the support of the distribution of voting transactions had
only S = 6.14 × 106 points. Altering X% of votes can alter margins by
more than 2X%.
Confidence Test Limit Altered Votes Bound (millions)
99% 2000 0.5% 3.87
99% 2000 1% 3.58
99% 2000 3% 2.69
99% 2000 5% 2.09
95% 2000 0.5% 1.67
95% 2000 1% 1.59
95% 2000 3% 1.31
95% 2000 5% 1.10
99% Inf 0.5% 3.73
99% Inf 1% 3.46
99% Inf 3% 2.61
99% Inf 5% 2.04
95% Inf 0.5% 1.65
95% Inf 1% 1.57
95% Inf 3% 1.29
95% Inf 5% 1.08
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Fig. 3. Minimum training sample sizes as a function of the percentage of altered transactions.
6 Complications and frustrations
The calculations above provide limits on how well parallel testing and passive testing can
work under optimistic conditions and optimistic assumptions. The reality is worse.
6.1 The only remedy is a new election
If testing discovers a BMD alters votes, it is appropriate to remove that BMD from service
and conduct a forensic investigation of that BMD—and all the other BMDs used in the
jurisdiction. But what about this election? There is no way to figure out which votes
were affected, nor even how many votes were affected. There is not even a way to tell
how many BMDs were affected, especially because malware could erase itself after the
election, leaving no forensic evidence.
6.2 Margins are not known
Margins are not known until the election is over, when it is too late to do more testing if
contests have narrower margins than anticipated. Testing to a pre-defined threshold, e.g.,
to ensure a 95% chance of detecting errors in 0.5% or more of the votes in any contest,
will sometimes turn out not to suffice. See Section 6.3 below.
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6.3 Tests have uncertainty
Relying on parallel testing to detect BMD faults has intrinsic uncertainties. For instance,
suppose it were possible to design practical parallel tests that had a 95% chance of sound-
ing an alarm if BMDs alter 0.5% or more of the votes in any contest. A reported margin
of 1% or less in a plurality contest12 would be below the “limit of detection.”13 Morally,
the outcome of such a contest is a tie. Would we revise election law to require a runoff
election whenever a reported margin is below 1%?
The principle of evidence-based elections (Stark and Wagner 2012, [@appelStark20]) is
that election officials should not only report the winners, but also provide persuasive
public evidence that the reported winners really won. Absent such evidence, there should
be a new election. That would mean holding a new election if the reported margin is
below the limit of detection.
And if a reported margin is greater than the limit of detection, we would still have only
95% “confidence” that BMD faults (bugs, misconfiguration, or hacking) did not cause
the wrong candidate to appear to win. If the BMD output reflects the wrong electoral
outcome, a perfect full manual tally, recount, or risk-limiting audit based on BMD printout
will (with high probability) confirm that wrong outcome.
6.4 New systems, extra hardware, additional staff, and
training would be needed
Parallel testing requires new infrastructure to generate the random test scripts “just-in-
time” and to signal the testers to conduct tests at random times. Infrastructure to log and
report test results and to respond to discrepancies would also be needed. Parallel testing
also requires deploying extra BMDs to compensate for the capacity lost to testing.
Additional pollworkers or other staff would be needed in every polling place to perform
the additional work, and they would need training. Effective testing is likely to slow down
voting, exacerbating the fragility of BMD-based voting systems. And testing when BMDs
are busiest is crucial, or malware could easily avoid detection.
6.5 Special risks for some voters
As discussed above in Section 4.1, BMDs are an ideal tool to disenfranchise voters with
disabilities, older voters, and voters whose preferred language is not English. Indeed,
Mallory’s best strategy for altering outcomes involves targeting such voters, in part be-
cause poll workers might more likely to think that complaints by such voters reflect voter
mistakes rather than BMD malfunctions.
12 For non-plurality social choice functions such as ranked choice or instant runoff, there is more than
one definition of the margin, and the margin can be difficult to calculate. The relevant question is
whether a change to 0.5% of the votes in a contest could cause the wrong candidate to appear to
win, given the social choice function in that contest. If so, then the contest outcome is in doubt, and
a new election seems like the appropriate remedy.
13 If there are undervotes, the “limit of detection” measured as a margin is higher, as discussed above:
changing 0.5% of transactions could change the margin by more than 1%.
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6.6 Auditing versus testing
As a statistical problem, auditing election outcomes using a trustworthy paper trail (e.g.,
checking outcomes using a risk-limiting audit (Stark 2008, 2009, 2020; Lindeman and
Stark 2012)) is easier than parallel testing of BMDs, in part because such audits only
need to detect errors that favored the reported winner(s), and in part because errors
tabulating the vote are evident by looking at the cast ballots—provided the paper trail
is trustworthy. In contrast, parallel BMD testing needs to detect errors that favor any
candidate (because the testing happens before a winner is reported) and to catch the
malware in the act by testing the right input to the right BMD at the right time.
6.7 Can BMDs ever be secure?
BMDs as currently deployed make voters responsible for checking whether BMDs perform
correctly, but there is no way a voter can prove to others that a malfunction occurred
(Stark 2019; A. W. Appel, DeMillo, and Stark 2020). Election officials will always be in a
bind if BMD problems are reported, because there is no way to tell the difference between
a misbehaving machine, voter error, and a cry of “wolf.” The design and use of BMDs
needs to be re-thought from the ground up so that either:
a. voters get evidence of malfunctions that can be used to demonstrate to others that a
malfunction occurred, or
b. some other mechanism is in place that has a high probability of catching any BMD
malfunctions that could alter election outcomes.
To address (a) requires a novel technology for marking ballots that enables voters to pro-
vide public evidence of any malfunctions they notice—without making elections vulnerable
to false accusations and without compromising voter privacy. Some protocols developed
for end-to-end cryptographically verifiable (E2E-V) elections can allow voters to prove
that machines misbehaved in particular ways.14 Similar ideas might make it possible for
a voter to obtain evidence of MBD malfunction that could be presented to others. We are
not aware of any work in this direction.
L&A testing, parallel testing, and passive testing are attempts at (b). We have shown
that they do not suffice.
7 Conclusion
In theory, L&A testing, parallel testing, or passive testing might protect against malfunc-
tioning or hacked BMDs. In practice they require orders of magnitude more observation
and testing than is possible, even to protect against changes to a substantial fraction of
the votes in a jurisdiction. To our knowledge, no jurisdiction has conducted any parallel
testing of BMDs of the kind suggested by (Wallach 2019; Gilbert 2019), much less enough
14 E.g., the “Benaloh challenge,” as described in (Benaloh 2006). The Benaloh challenge can provide
proof that a machine encrypted a plaintext vote incorrectly, but it does not address what happens if
the voting machine prints the wrong plaintext vote.
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to have a large chance of detecting outcome-changing errors, bugs, or hacks. Parallel test-
ing requires more equipment (to leave enough capacity for voters), new infrastructure,
new procedures, and more pollworker training.
Even if it were possible to test enough to get high confidence that no more than some
threshold percentage the votes were changed in any contest, fairness would then demand
a runoff election in any contest decided by fewer votes than that threshold.
Well-designed BMDs may be the best extant technology for voters with some kinds of
disabilities to mark and cast a paper ballot independently. But there are many poorly
designed BMDs on the market, including some with easily exploited security flaws (Cohn
2018; Appel 2018) and some that do not enable voters with common disabilities to vote
independently (Secretary of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 2018, pp68–90). To our
knowledge, no commercial BMD system provides a means for blind voters to check whether
the printout matches their intended selections.
BMD printout should be designed to make it as easy as possible for voters to check whether
the printout matches their intended choices, but should also be difficult to distinguish from
a hand-marked paper ballot, to preserve the anonymity of votes. Voters with disabilities
should be provided an accessible, air-gapped way to check BMD printout. Voters should
be urged to check the printout and to request a fresh ballot if the printout does not match
their intended selections. And election officials should pay attention to the number and
distribution of spoiled BMD printouts.
But for the foreseeable future, prudent election administration requires minimizing the
number of voters who use BMDs.
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